Tainted water still major problem.

As Japan prepares to mark the first anniversary of the meltdowns at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant, the facility remains plagued with problems despite Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s declaration that the crisis has been brought under control.

In order to decommission reactors No. 1 through 4 at the crippled plant, it is imperative to improve the work environment by draining and decontaminating areas submerged in radioactive water as much as possible. The flow of ground water into these areas, however, means making such operations a reality is a long way off.

According to plant operator Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO), the amount of radioactive water at the plant, inclusive of treated water, has reached as much as some 200,000 cubic meters. The utility has managed to secure 165,000 cubic meters worth of temporary tanks and has been building tanks that can hold another 40,000 cubic meters of water, on top of a 4,000-cubic-meter underground “reservoir” being built. However, all of these facilities are expected to be full by this fall, making the utility’s efforts look like a shoestring operation even almost a year after the onset of the nuclear crisis.

Three essential tasks must be performed to shut down a nuclear plant: suspending the reactors, cooling them and containing radioactive materials. However, hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima No. 1 plant’s reactor buildings in the days after the tsunami hit damaged the reactor pressure vessels. In the opening hours of the crisis, pumper trucks and other machinery injected water into the reactors to cool them, but the water leaked out of the damaged pressure vessels and into the basements of the buildings — a continuing problem that has led to the ever-growing stock of contaminated water.

In June last year, TEPCO set up a circulating cooling system, in which radioactive materials are removed from contaminated water so that the water can be re-injected into the cores. The system had initially been made up of four stages — oil separators provided by Toshiba Corp., cesium absorption equipment provided by Kurion Inc. of the United States, a decontamination apparatus set up by France’s Areva SA, and desalination units by Hitachi Ltd. Areva’s system, plagued with repeated water leakages, was later designated as a back-up. As the total pipe length of these systems extends four kilometers, the risk of leaks remains.

In a road map for bringing the nuclear crisis under control announced by TEPCO in April last year, the utility had stipulated that the contaminated water would be treated and reduced by mid-January 2012. However, the utility pushed that deadline back to fiscal 2020 in its plant decommissioning plan announced in December last year.

Water flowing in from outside the plant has also been hampering the treatment of contaminated water. On top of rainwater pouring in through the damaged reactor buildings, 200-500 cubic meters of groundwater is estimated to be seeping into plant building basements daily.

“The more contaminated water we collect, the more groundwater flows in because of the changes in water pressure,” TEPCO spokesperson Junichi Matsumoto explains. In order to keep the pressure balanced, TEPCO has been maintaining the level of contaminated water in the basements, and no serious solution is in sight.

Furthermore, it appears difficult to dispose of the highly radioactive waste generated from the treatment of contaminated water. As of Feb. 21 this year, 581 cubic meters of radioactive mud has been accumulated, along with 358 used cesium filters. While TEPCO is planning to introduce dedicated containers for such materials by fiscal 2014, its road map for decommissioning the reactors only states that the materials “will be transported to disposal sites” as if these will be the final destination for the waste.

Numbers???

A mind-boggling 40,000 trillion becquerels of radioactive cesium, or twice the amount previously thought, may have spewed from the crippled Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant after the March 11 disaster, scientists say.

Michio Aoyama, a senior researcher at the Meteorological Research Institute, released the finding at a scientific symposium in Tsukuba, Ibaraki Prefecture, on Feb. 28.

The figure, which represents about 20 percent of the discharge during the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster, is twice as large as previous estimates by research institutions both in Japan and overseas.

It was calculated on the basis of radioactive content of seawater sampled at 79 locations in the north Pacific and is thought to more accurately reflect reality than previous simulation results.

Scientists believe that around 30 percent of the radioactive substances discharged during the crisis ended up on land, while the rest fell on the sea.

This makes it especially difficult to accurately evaluate the total amount of radioactive materials released. Thus, seaborne data is essential to the process.

The scientists measured cesium concentrations in seawater as of April and May last year. They then used a model of diffusion in the atmosphere and the oceans to evaluate the total amount of cesium released. The calculation produced estimates of 30-40 quadrillion becquerels.

The researchers also estimated that 24-30 quadrillion becquerels of that cesium reached the sea.

That combines the roughly 70 percent of the total discharge, which is thought to have reached the ocean, and the cesium content of radioactive water that Tokyo Electric Power Co., the nuclear plant operator, released from the plant to the sea.

While the latest study said 15-20 quadrillion becquerels of cesium-137 was released into the atmosphere, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency estimated the amount at 8.8 quadrillion becquerels. Similar data released by other researchers both in Japan and overseas ranged between 7 quadrillion and 35 quadrillion becquerels.

In the meantime, TEPCO on Feb. 28 began pouring cement on a trial basis from a marine platform onto the seabed in the port at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant. The work is intended to cover 7 hectares of seabed inside the breakwaters.

The aim is to prevent radioactive cesium that accumulated there from spreading offshore. The project is expected to take 3-4 months to finish.

During the trial, TEPCO will determine what thickness of cement cover is effective for the purpose. Choppy waters due to adverse weather conditions had obstructed the work.

Yep… Finally somebody said it on full mouth.

http://m.cbsnews.com/postwatch.rbml?videoid=50120655&feed_id=29

Kan’s office was unprepared handle nuclear crises.

The office of former Prime Minister Naoto Kan came in for scathing criticism in a Feb. 27 report on the handling of the Fukushima nuclear crisis’ opening days, with the document accusing the PM’s office of “grandstanding” and causing “useless confusion.”

The report, put together by the private Fukushima nuclear disaster independent investigative committee, concludes that the Prime Minister’s Office’s first response to the meltdowns at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant “increased the risk of worsening the situation through stress and useless confusion.” Furthermore, “grandstanding led to badly muddled crisis management measures” which did little or nothing to help prevent a worsening of the disaster. The report also rebuked the highest levels of government for meddling in emergency response measures.

The investigative committee, which began its work in September last year, is made up of six scientists and legal experts. Fukushima No. 1 plant operator Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) refused to cooperate with the committee’s inquiries.

One focus of the report is the Prime Minister’s Office’s dispatch of electricity trucks to the No. 1 plant when it lost all power in the March 11, 2011 tsunami, knocking out the reactors’ cooling systems. When the trucks arrived, there were no electrical cords to hook them up to the plant.

“That’s the point at which we (the government) began to distrust TEPCO,” then Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano (now economy, trade and industry minister) is quoted as saying in the report. However, the investigators concluded that government distrust of TEPCO was a factor behind the direct intervention of the PM’s Office.

The report also stated that “Orders by the Prime Minister’s Office and industry ministry that gas building up in the reactor vessels be vented right away (to reduce pressure) were not at all helpful,” citing the loss of power at the plant and the fact that TEPCO was waiting for local residents to be evacuated.

The report also takes Kan to task over the injection of sea water into the No. 1 reactor, stating that he confused the situation and risked making it far worse when, at a meeting at around 6 p.m. on March 12, he “vehemently” expressed worries that the injection would cause the reactor to go critical again and ordered a reappraisal of the planned operation. Fukushima No. 1 plant chief Masao Yoshida, however, began injecting sea water at 7:04 p.m., and ignored orders from both the Prime Minister’s Office and TEPCO’s Tokyo headquarters to stop.

“Had Yoshida obeyed the order from the Prime Minister’s Office, there was a real danger that the operation would have been started too late,” the report states. However, it furthermore concludes that the fact Yoshida took action in direct opposition to government and TEPCO orders was “a very serious risk in terms of crisis management.”

This satellite file image taken on March 14, 2011, and provided by DigitalGlobe shows the damaged Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear facility in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, northeastern Japan. (AP Photo/DigitalGlobe)
The report is not entirely damning of Kan’s actions, however, stating that his refusal on March 15 to allow TEPCO to abandon the nuclear plant “in the end compelled TEPCO to remain steadfast” as the crisis unfolded.

On the other hand, the report also states that Kan was aware he was making Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan Chairman Haruki Madarame and his Cabinet ministers uncertain about any objections they had to his decisions with his strong, top-down command style and insistence on his own opinions.

Furthermore, as leader, Kan’s “self-assertion was a positive in that he could judge the situation and implement countermeasures, but was a negative in that it became a form of psychological control of others involved and caused a withering of their roles in the crisis.

There are more nuklids then you think.

Stop Tokai!!!

TOKAI, Ibaraki — About 700 protesters surrounded the Tokai No. 2 nuclear power plant on Feb. 26, making calls against reactivating the plant and demanding the plant be decommissioned.

The human chain took place around Japan Atomic Power Co.’s Tokai No. 2 nuclear power plant in Tokai, Ibaraki Prefecture, on Feb. 26. The plant has been suspended for regular inspections.

Stretching nearly 1 kilometer long, participants formed the human chain hand in hand, calling against the reactivation of the Tokai No. 2 nuclear plant and for the decommissioning of the plant.

Some young people even traveled from outside the prefecture to take part in the protest after learning about the event via Twitter. The demonstration was organized by the “Tokai Daini Genpatsu Hairo Action,” comprised of the Ibaraki Heiwa Yogo Kenmin Kaigi (Ibaraki prefectural residents’ council for protecting peace) and other entities.

Participants joined a rally at a nearby park before hitting the streets and parading for about 30 minutes. After reaching the nuclear plant, they started forming the human chain.

“I hadn’t realized the danger of nuclear power plants until I was evacuated (from the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant). The blunder must not be repeated,” said a 57-year-old housewife who was forced to evacuate from Tomioka, Fukushima Prefecture, to Mito, Ibaraki Prefecture.

The news on Kashiwazaki NPP fire from yesterday.

Japanese media outlets are reporting around 11 pm Sunday night, TEPCO’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant’s fire alarms activated, and smoke was seen rising from the Unit 5 area. According to TEPCO, radioactive material leakage to the outside world has not been confirmed during the event.

The smoke was detected in a building full of heat-exchange equipment, but no fire was found by the time that the local fire department arrived on-scene, Tokyo Electric Power Co. According to TEPCO the reactor, which has been undergoing a scheduled inspection since late January, there is no fuel in nuclear reactors, all fuel is contained in spent fuel pool.

The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa No. 6 reactor will be suspended on March 26th.